| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4753 |
| DP4753 Dynamic Security Design | |
| Jean Charles Rochet; Bruno Biais; Thomas Mariotti; Guillaume Plantin | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-11-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine optimal policy in a two-country model with uncertainty and learning, where monetary policy actions affect the real economy through the real exchange rate channel. Our results show that whether policy should be cautious or activist depends on the size of one country relative to another. If one country is small relative to the other then activism is optimal. In contrast, if the two countries are equal sized then caution prevails. Caution is induced in the latter case because of the interaction between the home and foreign central banks. In a two-country symmetric equilibrium, learning is shown to be detrimental to welfare, implying that optimal policy is cautious. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | monetary policy Open economy Learning |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4753 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533669 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jean Charles Rochet,Bruno Biais,Thomas Mariotti,et al. DP4753 Dynamic Security Design. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
