| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4759 |
| DP4759 What Do Deficits Tell us About Debts? Empirical Evidence on Creative Accounting with Fiscal Rules in the EU | |
| Jurgen von Hagen; Guntram B. Wolff | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-11-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper analyses the effects on ex ante risk-shifting incentives and ex post fiscal costs of three policies that are frequently used in dealing with banking crises, namely, forbearance from prudential regulations, extension of blanket deposit guarantees, and provision of unrestricted liquidity support. In the context of a simple model of information-based bank runs, where banks are funded with both insured and uninsured deposits, the paper shows that the expectation of implementation of any of these policies leads to a reduction in the interest rate of uninsured deposits and in the bank?s incentives to take risk, but increases the expected fiscal costs of the crises. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Banking crises Bank runs Bank supervision Risk-shifting incentives Forbearance Deposit insurance Lender of last resort |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4759 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533675 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jurgen von Hagen,Guntram B. Wolff. DP4759 What Do Deficits Tell us About Debts? Empirical Evidence on Creative Accounting with Fiscal Rules in the EU. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
