| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4766 |
| DP4766 Caution or Activism? Monetary Policy Strategies in an Open Economy | |
| LUCIO SARNO; Martin Ellison; Jouko Vilmunen | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-11-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper argues that the efficiency distribution of players in a game determines how aggressively these players interact. We formalize the idea of balance of power: players fight very inefficient players but play softly versus equally (or more) efficient players. This theory of conduct predicts that entry by new firms leads to a less aggressive outcome if it creates a balance of power. A balance of power is created if more players get technologies that are close to the most efficient technology. Using a related argument, we show that an increase in entry costs can lead to more aggressive outcomes. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Pricing games Folk theorem Refinement of predicted outcomes Supergames Contestable market |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4766 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533681 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | LUCIO SARNO,Martin Ellison,Jouko Vilmunen. DP4766 Caution or Activism? Monetary Policy Strategies in an Open Economy. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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