| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4780 |
| DP4780 Anti-Dumping Duties and the Byrd Amendment | |
| David R Collie; Hylke Vandenbussche | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-12-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In repeated normal-form games, simple penal codes (Abreu 1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. We provide two examples illustrating that a subgame-perfect outcome may be supported only by a profile with the property that the continuation play after a deviation is tailored not only to the identity of the deviator, but also to the nature of the deviation. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Simple penal code Subgame perfect equilibrium Repeated extensive game Optimal punishment |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4780 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533694 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | David R Collie,Hylke Vandenbussche. DP4780 Anti-Dumping Duties and the Byrd Amendment. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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