| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4785 |
| DP4785 Local Ownership as Private Information: Evidence on the Monitoring-Liquidity Trade-Off | |
| Massimo Massa; José-Miguel Gaspar | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-12-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this Paper we measure the welfare cost of fluctuations in a simple representative agent economy with non-clearing markets. The market friction we consider involves price rigidities and a voluntary exchange-rationing scheme. These features are incorporated into an otherwise standard neoclassical growth model. We show that the frictions we introduce make the losses from fluctuations much bigger than in a frictionless environment. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Cost of business cycles Non-clearing markets Dynamic general equilibrium |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4785 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533699 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Massimo Massa,José-Miguel Gaspar. DP4785 Local Ownership as Private Information: Evidence on the Monitoring-Liquidity Trade-Off. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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