| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP4789
|
| DP4789 Hedging, Familiarity and Portfolio Choice |
| Massimo Massa; Andrei Simonov
|
| 发表日期 | 2004-12-23
|
| 出版年 | 2004
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | The economic theory of defense has traditionally described public safety as achieved through investments that deter adversaries. Deterrence is however ineffective, and preemptive defense is required, when a population of intended victims confronts supreme-value suicide terror. A moral dilemma then arises, since preemption may impose collective punishment, while, in the absence of preemption, the population of intended victims is exposed to acts of terror. We consider how a population of intended terror victims confronts the moral dilemma, and compare the threatened population?s response with the public-safety recommendations of external judges who are not personally affected by the threat of terror. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
|
| 关键词 | Defense economics
Defensive preemption
Counter-terrorism
Terror
International judges
Profiling
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4789
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533703
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Massimo Massa,Andrei Simonov. DP4789 Hedging, Familiarity and Portfolio Choice. 2004.
|
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