| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4803 |
| DP4803 The Mystery of Monogamy | |
| Omer Moav; Eric Gould; Avi Simhon | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-12-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper analyses the interaction between corporate taxes and corporate governance. We show that the characteristics of a taxation system affect the extraction of private benefits by company insiders. A higher tax rate increases the amount of income insiders divert and thus worsens governance outcomes. In contrast, stronger tax enforcement reduces diversion and, in so doing, can raise the stock market value of a company in spite of the increase in the tax burden. We also show that the corporate governance system affects the level of tax revenues and the sensitivity of tax revenues to tax changes. When the corporate governance system is ineffective (i.e., when it is easy to divert income), an increase in the tax rate can reduce tax revenues. We test this prediction in a panel of countries. Consistent with the model, we find that corporate tax rate increases have smaller (in fact, negative) effects on revenues when corporate governance is weaker. Finally, this approach provides a novel justification for the existence of a separate corporate tax based on profits. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Corporate taxation Corporate governance |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4803 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533714 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Omer Moav,Eric Gould,Avi Simhon. DP4803 The Mystery of Monogamy. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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