| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4808 |
| DP4808 Bundling and the Unanimity Rule | |
| Hans Gersbach; Ulrich Erlenmaier | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-12-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We use a broad range of contractual information to assess the empirical relevance of different financial theories of trade credit. The common feature of all financial theories is that suppliers have an advantage over other lenders in financing credit-constrained firms. While the reasons for the financing advantage differ across theories, they are usually related either to product characteristics or to market structure. We propose a novel identifying strategy that exploits this insight to analyse the trade credit volume and the contract terms. Our analysis suggests that the most important product characteristic for explaining trade credit volume and contract terms is the ease with which the seller?s product can be diverted. Market power in input and output markets also contributes to explain trade credit patterns. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Moral hazard Trade credits Collateral Contract theory |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4808 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533719 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hans Gersbach,Ulrich Erlenmaier. DP4808 Bundling and the Unanimity Rule. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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