G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP4810
DP4810 Large Devaluations and the Real Exchange Rate
Martin Eichenbaum; Sérgio Rebelo; Ariel Tomas Burstein
发表日期2004-12-23
出版年2004
语种英语
摘要Leniency programmes (or policies) reduce sanctions against cartel members that self-report to the Antitrust Authority. We focus on their ability to directly deter cartels and analogous criminal organizations by undermining internal trust, increasing individual incentives to ?cheat? on partners. Optimally designed ?courageous? leniency programmes reward the first party that reports sufficient information with the fines paid by all other parties, and with finitely high fines achieve the first best. ?Moderate? leniency programmes that only reduce or cancel sanctions, as implemented in reality, may also destabilize and deter cartels by (a) protecting agents that defect (and report) from fines; (b) protecting them from other agents? punishment; and (c) increasing the riskiness of taking part to a cartel.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Amnesty Antitrust Cartels Collusion Corruption Competition policy Immunity Law enforcement Leniency Oligopoly
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp4810
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533720
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Martin Eichenbaum,Sérgio Rebelo,Ariel Tomas Burstein. DP4810 Large Devaluations and the Real Exchange Rate. 2004.
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