| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4810 |
| DP4810 Large Devaluations and the Real Exchange Rate | |
| Martin Eichenbaum; Sérgio Rebelo; Ariel Tomas Burstein | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-12-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Leniency programmes (or policies) reduce sanctions against cartel members that self-report to the Antitrust Authority. We focus on their ability to directly deter cartels and analogous criminal organizations by undermining internal trust, increasing individual incentives to ?cheat? on partners. Optimally designed ?courageous? leniency programmes reward the first party that reports sufficient information with the fines paid by all other parties, and with finitely high fines achieve the first best. ?Moderate? leniency programmes that only reduce or cancel sanctions, as implemented in reality, may also destabilize and deter cartels by (a) protecting agents that defect (and report) from fines; (b) protecting them from other agents? punishment; and (c) increasing the riskiness of taking part to a cartel. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Amnesty Antitrust Cartels Collusion Corruption Competition policy Immunity Law enforcement Leniency Oligopoly |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4810 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533720 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Martin Eichenbaum,Sérgio Rebelo,Ariel Tomas Burstein. DP4810 Large Devaluations and the Real Exchange Rate. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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