| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4812 |
| DP4812 Idiosyncratic Volatility and Product Market Competition | |
| Massimo Massa; José-Miguel Gaspar | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-12-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The Paper addresses the issue of coordinated effects of mergers in the framework of a differentiated products model. Firms? assets are product varieties that can be sold individually or entirely transferred to another firm in a merger. We show that under symmetric optimal punishment schemes the highest feasible collusive price declines from any asset transfer to the largest firm as long as the size of the smallest firm is unchanged. In contrast, for fully optimal punishment schemes the prices of firms that get larger increase and those of firms that get smaller decrease. In all cases, however, mergers are unprofitable unless the length of product lines is very asymmetric. We discuss the implications of the analysis for merger policy. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Collusion Product lines Mergers Coordinated effects Joint dominance |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4812 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533722 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Massimo Massa,José-Miguel Gaspar. DP4812 Idiosyncratic Volatility and Product Market Competition. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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