| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4819 |
| DP4819 Dispersion of Opinion and Stock Returns | |
| William Goetzmann; Massimo Massa | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-12-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper shows that bank closure policies suffer from a ?too-many-to-fail? problem: when the number of bank failures is large, the regulator finds it ex-post optimal to bail out some or all failed banks, whereas when the number of bank failures is small, failed banks can be acquired by the surviving banks. This gives banks incentives to herd and increases systemic risk, the risk that many banks may fail together. The ex-post optimal regulation may thus be sub-optimal from an ex-ante standpoint. We formalize this time-inconsistency of bank regulation. We also argue that by allowing banks to purchase failed banks at discounted prices and by partially nationalizing the bailed-out banks, a regulator may be able to mitigate the induced systemic risk. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Bank regulation Systemic risk Bailout Moral hazard Herding |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4819 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533729 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | William Goetzmann,Massimo Massa. DP4819 Dispersion of Opinion and Stock Returns. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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