| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4840 |
| DP4840 Divide et Impera: Optimal Leniency Programmes | |
| Giancarlo Spagnolo | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-12-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper models aid agencies as financial intermediaries that do not make a financial return to depositors, since the depositors' concern is to transfer resources to investor-beneficiaries. This leads to a significant problem of verification of the agencies' activities. One solution to this problem is for an agency to employ altruistic workers at below-market wages: workers can monitor the agency's activity more closely than donors, and altruistic workers would not work at below-market rates unless the agency were genuinely transferring resources to beneficiaries. We consider conditions for this solution to be incentive compatible. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Signalling Non-profit Wage differential Donations altruism Two-sided market |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4840 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533732 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giancarlo Spagnolo. DP4840 Divide et Impera: Optimal Leniency Programmes. 2004. |
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