| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4848 |
| DP4848 On the Fit and Forecasting Performance of New Keynesian Models | |
| Frank Smets; Marco Del Negro; Rafael Wouters; Frank Schorfheide | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-01-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the effect of earnings manipulation on incentives within the corporate hierarchy. When top management manipulates earnings, it must prevent information leakage from corporate insiders to the outside world. If an insider (e.g. a division manager) gains evidence about earnings manipulation, the threat to blow the whistle can provide him/her with an additional payment. We show that it is easier for division managers to prove top management?s manipulations when the performance of their own divisions is low. Earnings manipulation therefore undermines division managers? incentives to exert effort and destroys value. We show that earnings manipulation is more likely to occur in flatter hierarchies; we also discuss implications of the auditing and whistle-blowing regulations of the Sarbanes Oxley Act. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Agency costs Sarbanes oxley act Whistleblowing Flat hierarchies |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4848 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533756 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Frank Smets,Marco Del Negro,Rafael Wouters,et al. DP4848 On the Fit and Forecasting Performance of New Keynesian Models. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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