G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP4850
DP4850 Earnings Manipulation and Incentives in Firms
Guido Friebel; Sergei Guriev
发表日期2005-01-23
出版年2005
语种英语
摘要We provide a long-term perspective on the individual retirement behaviour and on the future of early retirement. In a cross-country sample, we find that total pension spending depends positively on the degree of early retirement and on the share of elderly in the population, which increase the proportion of retirees, but has hardly any effect on the per capita pension benefits. We show that in a Markovian political economic theoretical framework, in which incentives to retire early are embedded, a political equilibrium is characterized by an increasing sequence of social security contribution rates converging to a steady state and early retirement. Comparative statistics suggest that aging and productivity slow-downs lead to higher taxes and more early retirement. However, when income effects are factored in, the model suggests that periods of stagnation ? characterized by decreasing labour income ? may lead middle-aged individuals to postpone retirement.
主题Labour Economics ; Public Economics
关键词Pensions Lifetime income effect Tax burden Politico-economic markovian equilibrium
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp4850
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533758
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Guido Friebel,Sergei Guriev. DP4850 Earnings Manipulation and Incentives in Firms. 2005.
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