G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP4851
DP4851 Long run Effects of Public Sector Sponsored Training in West Germany
Ruth Miquel; Michael Lechner; Conny Wunsch
发表日期2005-01-23
出版年2005
语种英语
摘要We study the political economy of social insurance in a world where individuals differ in both income and risk. Social insurance is financed through distortionary taxation and redistributes across income and risk. Individuals vote on social insurance that they can complement with insurance bought on the private market. Private insurance is actuarially fair but suffers from adverse selection, which results in a screening equilibrium with partial coverage. The equilibrium social insurance is the result of an electoral competition game where parties maximize the utility of their members. We calculate the equilibrium social insurance offered by the two parties as well as their equilibrium membership, and study how the equilibrium outcome is affected by electoral uncertainty, distortions from taxation, risk aversion and the distribution of risk and income. We then calibrate the model to US data from the PSID survey. Lastly, we study how the political demand for social insurance is affected by the possibility to redistribute through income taxation.
主题Public Economics
关键词Political economy Social insurance Redistribution Adverse selection
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp4851
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533759
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Ruth Miquel,Michael Lechner,Conny Wunsch. DP4851 Long run Effects of Public Sector Sponsored Training in West Germany. 2005.
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