| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4855 |
| DP4855 World Finance and the US 'New Economy': Risk Sharing and Risk Exposure | |
| Marcus Miller | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-01-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We explore the optimal delegation of decision rights by a principal to a better informed but biased agent. In an infinitely repeated game a long-lived principal faces a series of short-lived agents. Every period they play a cheap talk game a la Crawford and Sobel (1982) with constant bias, quadratic loss functions and general distributions of the state of the world. We characterize the optimal delegation schemes for all discount rates and show that they resemble organizational arrangements that are commonly observed, including centralization and threshold delegation. For small biases threshold delegation is optimal for almost all distributions. Outsourcing can only be optimal if the principal is sufficiently impatient. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Delegation Cheap talk Relational contract |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4855 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533763 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marcus Miller. DP4855 World Finance and the US 'New Economy': Risk Sharing and Risk Exposure. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Marcus Miller]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Marcus Miller]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Marcus Miller]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
