| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4864 |
| DP4864 Policy-oriented Parties and the Choice Between Social and Private Insurance | |
| Jean Hindricks; Philippe De Donder | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-01-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine how globalization affects firms? incentives to provide general worker training. We consider a three-stage game. In stage 1, firms invest in productivity-enhancing training. In stage 2, they can make wage offers for each others? workers. Finally, Cournot competition takes place. When two product markets become integrated, that is, replaced by a market with greater demand and more firms, training by each firm increases, provided the two markets are sufficiently small. When barriers between large markets are eliminated, training is reduced. Integration increases welfare if it does not reduce training. However, for large parameter regions, welfare falls if integration reduces training. We also show that opening markets to countries with publicly funded training or cheap, low-skilled labour can threaten apprenticeship systems. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | General worker training Human capital Oligopoly Turnover Globalization |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4864 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533771 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jean Hindricks,Philippe De Donder. DP4864 Policy-oriented Parties and the Choice Between Social and Private Insurance. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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