| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4870 |
| DP4870 Relational Delegation | |
| Niko Matouschek; Ricardo Alonso | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-01-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The European Union will be introducing a Europe-wide patent, the so-called Community Patent. Its aim is to foster innovative activity, but strategic effects between firms competing in R&D have not been considered in the official discourse. We show that, even if these are taken into account, the Community Patent will increase innovative activity and welfare. On the other hand, if the decision of participating in R&D is considered, then this increased R&D will be concentrated into fewer firms. Furthermore, we show that existing asymmetries between countries and firms are bound to increase. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Community patent R&d race Participation in r&d |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4870 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533775 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Niko Matouschek,Ricardo Alonso. DP4870 Relational Delegation. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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