| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4876 |
| DP4876 How to Win Twice at an Auction: On the Incidence of Commissions in Auction Markets | |
| Victor Ginsburgh; Nicolas Sahuguet | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-01-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyse the welfare consequences of an increase in the commissions charged by intermediaries in auction markets. We argue that while commissions are similar to taxes imposed on buyers and sellers the question of incidence deserves a new treatment in auction markets. We show that an increase in commissions makes sellers worse off, but buyers may strictly gain. The results are therefore strikingly different from the standard result that all consumers weakly lose after a tax or a commission increase. Our results are useful for evaluating compensation in price fixing conspiracies; in particular they suggest that the method used to distribute compensations in the class action against auction houses Christie?s and Sotheby?s was misguided. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Auctions Intermediation Commissions Welfare |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4876 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533781 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Victor Ginsburgh,Nicolas Sahuguet. DP4876 How to Win Twice at an Auction: On the Incidence of Commissions in Auction Markets. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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