| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4880 |
| DP4880 Optimal Monetary Policy Rules, Asset Prices and Credit Frictions | |
| Tommaso Monacelli; Ester Faia | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-01-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this Paper, we design democratic constitutions that can transcend the shortcomings of the unanimity rule. The constitution embeds the unanimity rule in a set of virtue-supporting principles: (a) broad packages with many public projects (bundling) are allowed, but can only be proposed once in a legislative term; (b) the person who designs the package is also taxed at the highest proposed rate; and (c) subsidies are forbidden. We show that such democratic constitutions can yield efficient public project provision. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Unanimity rule Bundling Constitutions Provision of public projects Amendment rules |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4880 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533784 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Tommaso Monacelli,Ester Faia. DP4880 Optimal Monetary Policy Rules, Asset Prices and Credit Frictions. 2005. |
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