G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP4880
DP4880 Optimal Monetary Policy Rules, Asset Prices and Credit Frictions
Tommaso Monacelli; Ester Faia
发表日期2005-01-23
出版年2005
语种英语
摘要In this Paper, we design democratic constitutions that can transcend the shortcomings of the unanimity rule. The constitution embeds the unanimity rule in a set of virtue-supporting principles: (a) broad packages with many public projects (bundling) are allowed, but can only be proposed once in a legislative term; (b) the person who designs the package is also taxed at the highest proposed rate; and (c) subsidies are forbidden. We show that such democratic constitutions can yield efficient public project provision.
主题Public Economics
关键词Unanimity rule Bundling Constitutions Provision of public projects Amendment rules
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp4880
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533784
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Tommaso Monacelli,Ester Faia. DP4880 Optimal Monetary Policy Rules, Asset Prices and Credit Frictions. 2005.
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