全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP4886 Is Cash Negative Debt? A Hedging Perspective on Corporate Financial Policies

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP4886
	DP4886 Is Cash Negative Debt? A Hedging Perspective on Corporate Financial Policies
	Viral Acharya; Heitor Almeida; Murillo Campello
发表日期	2005-02-23
出版年	2005
语种	英语
摘要	Multi-unit ascending auctions allow for equilibria in which bidders strategically reduce their demand and split the market at low prices. At the same time, they allow for pre-emptive bidding by incumbent bidders in a coordinated attempt to exclude entrants from the market. We consider an environment where both demand reduction and pre-emptive bidding are supported as equilibrium phenomena of the ascending auction. In a series of experiments, we compare its performance to that of the discriminatory auction. Strategic demand reduction is quite prevalent in the ascending auction even when entry by the newcomer imposes a (large) negative externality on incumbents. As a result, the ascending auction performs worse than the discriminatory auction both in terms of revenue and efficiency, while the two auction formats offer similar chances for newcomers to enter the market.
主题	Industrial Organization
关键词	Multi-license auctions Demand reduction External effects
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp4886
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533791
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Viral Acharya,Heitor Almeida,Murillo Campello. DP4886 Is Cash Negative Debt? A Hedging Perspective on Corporate Financial Policies. 2005.