G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP4894
DP4894 Firms' Productivity Growth and R&D Spillovers: An Analysis of Alternative Technological Proximity Measures
Michele Cincera
发表日期2005-02-23
出版年2005
语种英语
摘要We analyse an agency model where one individual decides how much evidence he collects. We assume that he has free access to information, but all the news acquired becomes automatically public. Conditional on the information disclosed, a second individual with conflicting preferences undertakes an action that affects the payoff of both agents. In this game of incomplete but symmetric information, we show that the first individual obtains rents due to his superior ability to decide whether to collect or forego evidence, i.e., due to his control in the generation of (public) information. We provide an analytical characterization of these rents, that we label ?rents of public ignorance?. They can be interpreted as, for example, the degree of influence that a chairman can exert on a committee due exclusively to his capacity to decide whether to keep discussions alive or terminate them and call a vote. Last, we show that similar insights are obtained if the agent decides first how much private information he collects and then how much of this information he transmits to the other agent.
主题Industrial Organization ; Public Economics
关键词Incomplete and symmetric information Learning Experimentation Optimal stopping rule Informational rents Information control Public ignorance Principal-agent
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp4894
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533798
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Michele Cincera. DP4894 Firms' Productivity Growth and R&D Spillovers: An Analysis of Alternative Technological Proximity Measures. 2005.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Michele Cincera]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Michele Cincera]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Michele Cincera]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。