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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP4899 |
DP4899 Demand Reduction and Pre-emptive Bidding in Multi-Unit License Auctions | |
Theo Offerman; Jacob K. Goeree; Randolph Sloof | |
发表日期 | 2005-02-23 |
出版年 | 2005 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Most dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models (DSGE) of the macroeconomy assume that labour is traded in a spot market. Two exceptions (Andolfatto [3], Merz [11]) combine the two-sided search model of Mortenson and Pissarides, [14], [13], [15] with a one-sector real business cycle model. These hybrid models are successful, in some dimensions, but they cannot account for observed volatility in unemployment and vacancies. Following a suggestion by Hall, [4] [5], building on work by Shimer [18], this Paper shows that a relatively standard DSGE model with sticky wages can account for these facts. Using a second-order approximation to the policy function I simulate moments of an artificial economy with and without sticky wages. I compute the welfare costs of the sticky wage equilibrium and find them to be small. |
主题 | International Macroeconomics |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4899 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533803 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Theo Offerman,Jacob K. Goeree,Randolph Sloof. DP4899 Demand Reduction and Pre-emptive Bidding in Multi-Unit License Auctions. 2005. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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