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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP4923 |
DP4923 International Financial Adjustment | |
Helene Rey; Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas | |
发表日期 | 2005-02-23 |
出版年 | 2005 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper studies the question to what extent premia for macroeconomic risks in banking are sufficient to avoid banking crises. We investigate a competitive banking system embedded in an overlapping generation model subject to repeated macroeconomic shocks. We show that even if banks fully incorporate macroeconomic risks in their pricing of loans, a banking system may enter bankruptcy with probability one. A major cause for this default is that risk premia of a competitive banking system may become too small if the capital base is low. |
主题 | Financial Economics ; International Macroeconomics |
关键词 | Financial intermediation Macroeconomic risks Banking crises Risk premia Banking regulation |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4923 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533824 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Helene Rey,Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas. DP4923 International Financial Adjustment. 2005. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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