| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4928 |
| DP4928 Je T'aime, Moi Non Plus: Bilateral Opinions and International Trade | |
| Thierry Mayer; Anne-Célia Disdier | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-02-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyse how the governance structure of political parties influences electoral competition. Parties choose their organization to manipulate the incentives of politicians to provide effort. We show that intra- and inter-party competition interact to shape these incentives. We also get new insights on the role of information, polarization, and on the value of rents from office. More extreme parties tend to prefer less democratic governance structures. Instead, democratic structures are preferred when voters are ill informed about the candidates? performance and when the rents from office are low. We use our theory to interpret the introduction of the Direct Primary system in the USA at the beginning of the 20th century. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Parties Candidates Internal organization Incentives |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4928 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533829 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thierry Mayer,Anne-Célia Disdier. DP4928 Je T'aime, Moi Non Plus: Bilateral Opinions and International Trade. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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