| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4939 |
| DP4939 Marriage and the City | |
| Coen N. Teulings; Pieter A. Gautier; Michael Svarer | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-03-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study asymmetric all-pay auctions with multiple objects where players? values for the objects are common knowledge. The players have different values for the objects but they have the same ranking. The contest designer may award one prize including all the objects to the player with the highest bid, or, alternatively, they may allocate several prizes, each prize including one object such that the first prize is awarded to the player with the highest bid, the second prize to the player with the second-highest bid, and so on until all the objects are allocated. We analyse the distribution of effort in one-prize and multiple-prize contests and show that allocation of several prizes may be optimal for a contest designer who maximizes the total effort. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Contests Auctions |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4939 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533838 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Coen N. Teulings,Pieter A. Gautier,Michael Svarer. DP4939 Marriage and the City. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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