G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP4943
DP4943 Neoclassical Growth and the 'Trivial' Steady State
Andreas Irmen; Hendrik Hakenes
发表日期2005-03-23
出版年2005
语种英语
摘要Corporations in many countries are run by controlling shareholders whose cash flow rights in the firm are substantially smaller than their control rights. This separation of ownership and control allows the controlling shareholders to pursue private benefits at the cost of minority investors by diverting resources away from the firm and distorting corporate investment and payout policies. We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model to study the asset pricing and welfare implications of imperfect investor protection. The model predicts that countries with weaker investor protection have more incentives to overinvest, lower Tobin?s q, higher return volatility, larger risk premium, and higher interest rate, consistent with existing empirical evidence. We show that weak investor protection causes significant wealth redistribution from outside shareholders to controlling shareholders. Finally, we provide evidence consistent with our model?s two new predictions: countries with higher investment-capital ratios have both larger variance of GDP growth and larger variance of stock returns.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Asset pricing Investment specific technological change Agency conflicts Investor protection Overinvestment
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp4943
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533842
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Andreas Irmen,Hendrik Hakenes. DP4943 Neoclassical Growth and the 'Trivial' Steady State. 2005.
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