| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4959 |
| DP4959 Time Variation in Term Premia: International Evidence | |
| Christian Wolff; Willem F C Verschoor; Ron Jongen | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-03-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyse how sharing rules affect Nash equilibria in Bertrand games, where the sharing of profits at ties is a decisive assumption. Necessary conditions for either positive or zero equilibrium profits are derived. Zero profit equilibria are shown to exist under weak conditions if the sharing rule is ?sign-preserving?. For Bertrand markets we define the class of ?expectation sharing rules?, where profits at ties are derived from some distribution of quantities. In this class the winner-takes-all sharing rule is the only one that is always sign-preserving, while for each pair of demand and cost functions there may be many others. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Bertrand games Sharing rule Tie-breaking rule Sign-preserving sharing rules Expectation sharing rules |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4959 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533858 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christian Wolff,Willem F C Verschoor,Ron Jongen. DP4959 Time Variation in Term Premia: International Evidence. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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