| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4995 |
| DP4995 Equilibria in a Dynamic Global Game: The Role of Cohort Effects | |
| Paul Heidhues; Nicolas Melissas | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-04-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | There has been little empirical work evaluating the sensitivity of fertility to financial incentives at the household level. We put forward an identification strategy that relies on the fact that variation of wages induces variation in benefits and tax credits among 'comparable' households. We implement this approach by estimating a discrete choice model of female participation and fertility, using individual data from the French Labor Force Survey and a fairly detailed representation of the French tax-benefit system. Our results suggest that financial incentives play a notable role in determining fertility decisions in France, both for the first and for the third child. As an example, an unconditional child benefit with a direct cost of 0:3% of GDP might raise total fertility by about 0:3 point. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Population Fertility Incentives Benefits |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4995 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533893 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Paul Heidhues,Nicolas Melissas. DP4995 Equilibria in a Dynamic Global Game: The Role of Cohort Effects. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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