| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4999 |
| DP4999 Rules of Origin as Export Subsidies | |
| Akiko Suwa-Eisenmann; Olivier Cadot; Antoni Estevadeordal | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-04-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A student's future log-wage is given by the sum of a skill premium and a random personal ?ability? term. Students observe only a private, noisy signal of their ability, and universities can condition admission decisions on the results of noisy tests. We assume first that universities are maximizing social surplus, and contrast the results with those obtained when they maximize rents. If capital markets are perfect, and if test results are public knowledge, then, there is no sorting on the basis of test scores. Students optimally self-select as a result of pricing only. In the absence of externalities generated by an individual's higher education, the optimal tuition is then greater than the university's marginal cost. If capital markets are perfect but asymmetries of information are bilateral, i.e., if universities observe a private signal of each student's ability, or if there are borrowing constraints, then, the optimal policy involves a mix of pricing and pre-entry selection based on the university's private information. Optimal tuition can then be set below marginal cost, and can even become negative, if the precision of the university's private assessment of students' abilities is high enough. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Tuition fees Examinations State subsidies Higher education Incomplete information |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4999 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533897 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Akiko Suwa-Eisenmann,Olivier Cadot,Antoni Estevadeordal. DP4999 Rules of Origin as Export Subsidies. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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