G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP5001
DP5001 Conflicts of Interest in Sell-Side Research and the Moderating Role of Institutional Investors
Alexander Ljungqvist; Felicia Marston; Hong Yan; Laura T Starks; Kelsey D. Wei
发表日期2005-04-23
出版年2005
语种英语
摘要We develop democratic mechanisms where individual utilities are not observable by other people at the legislative stage. We show that an appropriate combination of three rules can yield efficient provision of public projects: first, flexible and double majority rules where the size of the majority depends on the proposal and verifiable parameters and taxed and non-taxed individuals need to support the proposal; second, flexible agenda costs where the agenda-setter has to pay a certain amount of money if his proposal does not generate enough supporting votes; third, a ban on subsidies. We provide a rationale why double majority rules are used in practice. We also show that higher degrees of uncertainty about project parameters can make it easier to achieve first-best allocations and that universal equal treatment with regard to taxation is undesirable.
主题Public Economics
关键词Democratic constitutions Unobservable utilities Double majority rules Flexible agenda cost rules
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp5001
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533899
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Alexander Ljungqvist,Felicia Marston,Hong Yan,et al. DP5001 Conflicts of Interest in Sell-Side Research and the Moderating Role of Institutional Investors. 2005.
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