| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5002 |
| DP5002 The Impact of TFP Growth on Steady-State Unemployment | |
| Christopher Pissarides | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-04-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We characterize the optimal renegotiation-proof contract in a dynamic Principal-Agent model in which the type of the agent may change stochastically over time. Contrary to the case with constant types, the ex ante optimal contract may be renegotiation-proof even if types are highly correlated. The marginal benefit of having some pooling of types in the first period is not monotonic in their persistence level, but the equilibrium level of pooling is non-decreasing in persistence; and, for any level persistence, it is always optimal to partially screen the types by offering a menu of choices to the agent. Despite the non-linearity of the problem, the optimal equilibrium allocation is unique. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Contract theory Dynamic contracts Renegotiation Regulation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5002 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533900 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christopher Pissarides. DP5002 The Impact of TFP Growth on Steady-State Unemployment. 2005. |
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