| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5006 |
| DP5006 Offsetting the Incentives: Risk Shifting and Benefits of Benchmarking in Money Management | |
| Suleyman Basak; Anna Pavlova; Alex Shapiro | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-04-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper demonstrates how time consistency of the Ramsey policy (the optimal fiscal and monetary policy under commitment) can be achieved. Each government should leave its successor with a unique maturity structure for the nominal and indexed debt, such that the marginal benefit of a surprise inflation exactly balances the marginal cost. Unlike in earlier papers on the topic, the result holds for quite general Ramsey policies, including time-varying polices with positive inflation and positive nominal interest rates. We compare our results with those in Persson, Persson and Svensson (1987), Calvo and Obstfeld (1990), and Alvarez, Kehoe and Neumeyer (2004). |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Time consistency Ramsey policy Surprise inflation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5006 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533904 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Suleyman Basak,Anna Pavlova,Alex Shapiro. DP5006 Offsetting the Incentives: Risk Shifting and Benefits of Benchmarking in Money Management. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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