| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5009 |
| DP5009 City Structure, Job Search and Labour Discrimination. Theory and Policy Implications | |
| Yves Zenou; Harris Selod | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-04-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The protection that innovators obtain through intellectual property rights crucially depends on their incentives and ability to litigate infringers. Taking patents as a notable example, we study how the financing of legal costs can alter the incentives to litigate in defence of a patent and, thus, the prospects of infringement and the effective protection of the innovator. We compare the resort to a financier once the infringement has occurred (ex-post financing) with patent litigation insurance (PLI) as well as other ex-ante arrangements based on leverage. We show that the ex-ante arrangements can be designed (for instance, in the case of PLI, by including an appropriate deductible) so as to implement the innovator?s second-best outcome: a situation in which patent predation is deterred without inducing excessive litigation. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Financial strategy Intellectual property Litigation Predation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5009 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533907 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Yves Zenou,Harris Selod. DP5009 City Structure, Job Search and Labour Discrimination. Theory and Policy Implications. 2005. |
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