| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5013 |
| DP5013 Democratic Mechanisms: Double Majority Rules and Flexible Agenda Costs | |
| Hans Gersbach | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-04-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider standard cash-in-advance monetary models and show that there are interest rate or money supply rules such that equilibria are unique. The existence of these single instrument rules depends on whether the economy has an infinite horizon or an arbitrarily large but finite horizon. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | monetary policy Interest rate rules Unique equilibrium |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5013 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533911 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hans Gersbach. DP5013 Democratic Mechanisms: Double Majority Rules and Flexible Agenda Costs. 2005. |
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