| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP5024
|
| DP5024 Finite State Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information: A Framework for Applied Work |
| Chaim Fershtman; Ariel Pakes
|
| 发表日期 | 2005-04-23
|
| 出版年 | 2005
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Official adjustments of the budget balance to the cycle merely assume that the only category of government spending that responds automatically to the cycle is unemployment compensation. But estimates show otherwise. Payments for pensions, health, subsistence, invalidity, childcare and subsidies of all sorts to firms respond automatically and significantly to the cycle as well. In addition, it is fairly common to borrow official figures for cyclically adjusted budget balances, divide by potential output, and then use the resulting ratios to study discretionary fiscal policy. But if potential output is not deterministic but subject to supply shocks, then apart from anything else, those ratios are inefficient estimates of the cyclically-independent ratios of budget balances divided by potential output. (A fortiori, they are inefficient estimates of the cyclically adjusted ratios of budget balances to observed output.) Accordingly, the paper provides separate estimates of the impact of the cycle on the levels of budget balances and the ratios of budget balances to output. In addition, it discusses the relation between the two sorts of estimates. When the focus is on ratios of budget balances to output, the cyclical adjustments depend more on inertia in government spending on goods and services than they do on taxes (which are largely proportional to output). But they depend even still more on transfer payments. Besides calling for different series for discretionary fiscal policy if ratios serve, these results also raise questions about the general policy advice to ?let the automatic stabilizers work?. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics
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| 关键词 | Automatic stabilization
Discretionary fiscal policy
Cyclically adjusted budget balances
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| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5024
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| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533922
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Chaim Fershtman,Ariel Pakes. DP5024 Finite State Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information: A Framework for Applied Work. 2005.
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