| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5026 |
| DP5026 The Replacement Problem in Frictional Economies: An 'Equivalence Result' | |
| Giovanni L. Violante; Andreas Hornstein | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-04-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyses cooperation among national supervisors in the decision to close a multinational bank. The supervisors are asymmetrically informed and exchange information through ?cheap talk?. It is assumed that they consider domestic welfare only. We show that: (1) the supervisors will commit mistakes both of ?type I? and ?type II? in the closure decision; (2) the more aligned national interests are, the higher is welfare resulting from the closure decision; (3) the bank can allocate its investments strategically to escape closure; (4) allocating the decision right to an uninformed supranational supervisor can improve closure regulation, especially when interests are very disaligned. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Multinational banks supervision Closure Cheap talk |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5026 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533924 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giovanni L. Violante,Andreas Hornstein. DP5026 The Replacement Problem in Frictional Economies: An 'Equivalence Result'. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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