| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5105 |
| DP5105 Zero Returns to Compulsory Schooling in Germany: Evidence and Interpretation | |
| Jorn-Steffen Pischke; Till von Wachter | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-06-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a model of information exchange between calling parties. We characterize the equilibrium when two interconnected networks compete for such users by charging both for outgoing and incoming calls. We show that networks have reduced incentives to use off-net price discrimination to induce a connectivity breakdown when calls originated and received are complements in the information exchange. This breakdown disappears if operators are allowed to negotiate reciprocal access charges. We also show that a ?bill-and-keep? system over access charges can approximate an efficient regime and we discuss when this system emerges from private negotiations. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Interconnection Access charges Reception charges Bill-and-keep Information exchange |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5105 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533995 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jorn-Steffen Pischke,Till von Wachter. DP5105 Zero Returns to Compulsory Schooling in Germany: Evidence and Interpretation. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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