| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5119 |
| DP5119 CEO-Firm Match and Principal-Agent Problem | |
| Masako Ueda; Fei Li | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-07-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study all-pay contests in which there is a positive probability of a tied outcome. We analyse both one-stage contests and multi-stage contests with tie-breaks. We demonstrate that in symmetric two-player contests, the designer does not have an incentive to award a prize in a case of a tie. Consequently, in symmetric multi-stage two-player contests, the designer should allow an unlimited number of tie-breaks until a winner is decided. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Contests All-pay auctions |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5119 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534008 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Masako Ueda,Fei Li. DP5119 CEO-Firm Match and Principal-Agent Problem. 2005. |
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