| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP5121
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| DP5121 Is There a Diversification Discount in Financial Conglomerates? |
| Ross Levine; Luc Laeven
|
| 发表日期 | 2005-07-23
|
| 出版年 | 2005
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | The EU declares to provide support for the rural and poor regions of its member states. However, recent research shows that past EU budget allocations (in EU-15) can largely be explained by measures of the distribution of voting power in the Council of Ministers deciding on the bulk of EU spending. Yet, empirical analysis also indicates that the needs of the member states play a role in the determination of their receipts from the EU budget. As a rough estimate, power explains 60% of the budget allocation and, when stable coalition structures among member countries are allowed, even 90%. In this paper we use such estimates to predict EU budget shares after the eastern enlargement. We compare incumbent member states' predicted budget receipts before and after eastern enlargement, and examine the impact of different voting rule proposals on predicted budget shares and receipts in EU-25. According to our estimates, eastern enlargement has large effects on the budget receipts of the incumbent member states. Moreover, whether the voting rules are based on the Nice Treaty (NT) or the Constitutional Treaty (CT) makes a difference for most member states. Many member states would be worse off under CT than under NT. In relative terms, Germany would be the biggest winner under CT, because under CT population counts more on power than under NT voting rules. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics
|
| 关键词 | Eu budget
Voting power
Constitutional treaty
Treaty of nice
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5121
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534010
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Ross Levine,Luc Laeven. DP5121 Is There a Diversification Discount in Financial Conglomerates?. 2005.
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