G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP5125
DP5125 Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation and Voter Welfare
Ben Lockwood; Jean Hindricks
发表日期2005-07-23
出版年2005
语种英语
摘要In this paper we test the well-known hypothesis of Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) that trade costs are the key to explaining the so-called Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. Using a gravity framework in an intertemporal context, we provide strong support for the hypothesis and we reconcile our results with the so-called home bias puzzle. Interestingly, this requires fundamental revision of Obstfeld and Rogoff?s argument. A further novelty of our work is in tying bilateral trade behaviour to desired aggregate trade balances and desired intertemporal trade.
主题International Macroeconomics
关键词Feldstein-horioka puzzle Trade costs Gravity model Home bias Puzzle Current account Trade balance
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp5125
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534013
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Ben Lockwood,Jean Hindricks. DP5125 Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation and Voter Welfare. 2005.
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