| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5131 |
| DP5131 Exogenous Oil Supply Shocks: How Big Are They and How Much do they Matter for the US Economy? | |
| Lutz Kilian | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-07-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper discusses the optimal organization of sequential agency problems with contractible control actions under limited liability. In each of two stages, a risk-neutral agent can choose an unobservable effort level. A success in the first stage makes effort in the second stage more effective. Should one agent be in control in both stages (integration), or should different agents be in charge of the two actions (separation)? Both modes of organization can be explained on the basis of incentive considerations due to moral hazard, without resorting to commitment problems or ad hoc restrictions on the class of feasible contracts. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Contract theory Hidden action Limited liability Moral hazard |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5131 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534019 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lutz Kilian. DP5131 Exogenous Oil Supply Shocks: How Big Are They and How Much do they Matter for the US Economy?. 2005. |
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