| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5141 |
| DP5141 How to Exit from Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes | |
| Charles Wyplosz; Nadezhda Ivanova; Ahmet Atil Asici | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-07-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | As the number of bank failures increases, the set of assets available for acquisition by the surviving banks enlarges but the total amount of available liquidity within the surviving banks falls. This results in ?cash-in-the-market? pricing for liquidation of banking assets. At a sufficiently large number of bank failures, and in turn, at a sufficiently low level of asset prices, there are too many banks to liquidate and inefficient users of assets who are liquidity-endowed may end up owning the liquidated assets. In order to avoid this allocation inefficiency, it may be ex post optimal for the regulator to bail out some failed banks. Ex ante, this gives banks an incentive to herd by investing in correlated assets, thereby making aggregate banking crises more likely. These effects are robust to allowing the surviving banks to issue equity and allowing the regulator to price-discriminate against outsiders in the market for bank sales. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Bank regulation Systemic risk Banking crises Time inconsistency Too many to fail Herding |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5141 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534027 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Charles Wyplosz,Nadezhda Ivanova,Ahmet Atil Asici. DP5141 How to Exit from Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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