| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5142 |
| DP5142 How Inefficient is the 1/N Asset-Allocation Strategy? | |
| Lorenzo Garlappi; Victor DeMiguel | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-07-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine whether the central bank council of a monetary union should publish its voting records when members are appointed by national politicians. We show that the publication of voting records lowers overall welfare if the private benefits of holding office are sufficiently low. High private benefits of central bankers lower overall welfare under opacity, as they induce European central bankers to care more about being re-appointed than about beneficial policy outcomes. We show that opacity and low private benefits jointly guarantee the optimal welfare level. Moreover, we suggest that non-renewable terms for national central bankers and delegating the appointment of all council members to a European agency would be desirable. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Central banks Transparency voting |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5142 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534028 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lorenzo Garlappi,Victor DeMiguel. DP5142 How Inefficient is the 1/N Asset-Allocation Strategy?. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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