| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5154 |
| DP5154 Cash-in-the-Market Pricing and Optimal Bank Bailout Policy | |
| Viral Acharya; Tanju Yorulmazer | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-07-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Societies are characterized by customs governing the allocation of non-market goods such as marital partnerships. We explore how such customs affect the educational investment decisions of young singles and the subsequent joint labour supply decisions of partnered couples. We consider two separate matching paradigms for agents with heterogeneous abilities - one where partners marry for money and the other where partners marry for romantic reasons orthogonal to productivity or debt. These generate different investment incentives and therefore have a real impact on the market economy. While marrying for money generates greater investment efficiency, romantic matching generates greater allocative efficiency, since more high ability individuals participate in the labour market. The analysis offers the possibility of explaining cross-country differences in educational investments and labour force participation based on matching regimes. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Education Participation Matching Marriage Cohabitation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5154 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534039 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Viral Acharya,Tanju Yorulmazer. DP5154 Cash-in-the-Market Pricing and Optimal Bank Bailout Policy. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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