| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5163 |
| DP5163 Basel II and Bank Lending to Emerging Markets: Micro Evidence from German Banks | |
| Thilo Liebig; Beatrice Weder di Mauro; Daniel Porath; Michael Wedow | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-08-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | When politicians are provided with insufficient incentives by the democratic election mechanism, social welfare can be improved by threshold contracts. A threshold contract stipulates the performance level that a politician must reach in order to obtain the right to stand for re-election. 'Read my lips' turns into 'read my contract'. Politicians can offer the threshold contracts during their campaign. These threshold contracts do not violate the liberal principle of free and anonymous elections in democracies. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Elections Threshold contract Democracy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5163 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534048 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thilo Liebig,Beatrice Weder di Mauro,Daniel Porath,et al. DP5163 Basel II and Bank Lending to Emerging Markets: Micro Evidence from German Banks. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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