| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5172 |
| DP5172 Urbanization Externalities, Market Potential and Spatial Sorting of Skills and Firms | |
| Giordano Mion; Paolo Naticchioni | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-08-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine the role of security design when lenders make inefficient accept-or-reject decisions after screening projects. Lenders may be either 'too conservative', in which case they reject positive-NPV projects. Or they may be 'too aggressive', in which case they accept negative-NPV projects. In the first case, the uniquely optimal security is debt. In the second case, it is levered equity. Debt maximizes lenders? payoffs from financing low-NPV projects, i.e., projects that have a high probability mass on low cashflows, thus minimizing their conservatism. Conversely, levered equity minimizes lenders? payoffs from financing low-NPV projects, thus minimizing their aggressiveness. In equilibrium, profitable projects that are relatively likely to break even are financed with debt, while less profitable projects are financed with equity. Highly profitable projects are financed by uninformed arm?s-length lenders. Finally, loan terms are insensitive with respect to the screening outcome: borrowers are either accepted, in which case they all obtain the same loan terms, or rejected. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Security design Debt Equity Screening |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5172 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534057 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giordano Mion,Paolo Naticchioni. DP5172 Urbanization Externalities, Market Potential and Spatial Sorting of Skills and Firms. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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