| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5187 |
| DP5187 Risk Management with Benchmarking | |
| Lucie Teplá; Suleyman Basak; Alex Shapiro | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-08-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the implication of the standard principal-agent theory developed by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) on the endogenous matching of CEO and firm. We show that a CEO with low disutility of effort, low risk aversion, or both should manage a safer firm in the matching equilibrium, and that a CEO in a safer firm should receive a higher compensation than average. Nevertheless, these predictions are not supported by data; proxies for low disutility such as educational achievement and experience are either not related to firm risks or significantly related but in the direction opposite to that predicted by the theory. CEOs of safer firms are paid less than average, again contrary to the standard principal-agent theory. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Principal-agent problem Sorting |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5187 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534071 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lucie Teplá,Suleyman Basak,Alex Shapiro. DP5187 Risk Management with Benchmarking. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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