| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5201 |
| DP5201 Political Selection and the Quality of Government: Evidence from South India | |
| Tim Besley; Rohini Pande; Vijayendra Rao | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-08-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies the relationship between fiscal decentralization and electoral accountability, by analysing how decentralization impacts upon incentive and selection effects, and thus on voter welfare. The model abstracts from features such as public good spillovers or economies of scale, so that absent elections, voters are indifferent about the fiscal regime. The effect of fiscal centralization on voter welfare works through two channels: (i) via its effect on the probability of pooling by the bad incumbent; (ii) conditional on the probability of pooling, the extent to which, with centralization, the incumbent can divert rents in some regions without this being detected by voters in other regions (selective rent diversion). Both these effects depend on the information structure; whether voters only observe fiscal policy in their own region, in all regions, or an intermediate case with a uniform tax across all regions. More voter information does not necessarily raise voter welfare, and under some conditions, voter would choose uniform over differentiated taxes ex ante to constrain selective rent diversion. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Fiscal decentralization Elections Accountability |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5201 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534076 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Tim Besley,Rohini Pande,Vijayendra Rao. DP5201 Political Selection and the Quality of Government: Evidence from South India. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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