| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5216 |
| DP5216 The Stability Pact Pains: A Forward-Looking Assessment of the Reform Debate | |
| Sylvester Eijffinger; Daniele Franco; Marco Buti | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-09-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper presents a political economy model that explains the low rate of emission taxes in the U.S., as well as the fact that neither Democrats nor Republicans propose to increase them. The voters differ according to their wage and capital incomes which are assumed to have a bivariate lognormal distribution. They vote over the emission tax rate and a budgetary rule that specifies how to redistribute the tax proceeds. The political competition is modeled à la Roemer (2001) where the two parties care for the policies they propose as well as the probability of winning; the equilibrium solution concept is the Party Unanimity Nash Equilibrium (PUNE). We calibrate the model using U.S. data and compute the PUNEs numerically. Two main results emerge. All "viable" PUNEs entail subsidies on emissions (as opposed to taxes). This indicates the importance of distributional concerns in garnering political support for environmental policies. Second, parties always propose an interior value for the budgetary rule even though all citizens prefer extreme values. This illustrates the emergence of political compromise to attract voters. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Emission taxes Political competition Pune Distributional concerns Political compromise |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5216 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534089 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sylvester Eijffinger,Daniele Franco,Marco Buti. DP5216 The Stability Pact Pains: A Forward-Looking Assessment of the Reform Debate. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
